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CWD Response to Ammunition  
   Depot Accidents
While casualties inevitably occur during wars as a result of hostilities, munitions explosions are far 
more dangerous because they can injure or kill thousands of civilians and military personnel in a 
single incident. These detonations are not a new occurrence; they have happened as far back as 
World War I.
On 6 December 1917, during World War I, nearly 2,000 people were killed and an additional 9,000 were injured in one accident, when a French am-
munition ship, the SS Mont Blanc, collided with a Norwegian 
cargo vessel, the SS Imo, in Halifax Harbor, Nova Scotia, 
Canada. The collision sparked a fire that ignited over 2,500 
tons of munitions aboard the Mount Blanc. The cargo in-
cluded 2,325 tons of picric acid, 225 tons of TNT, 21 tons of 
guncotton (nitrocellulose) and 35 tons of benzene.1 Until the 
advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, this was the largest man-
made explosion and is still the world’s largest unplanned, 
conventional munitions explosion to date, with a force equiv-
alent to 2.9 kilotons of explosives.2
During World War II, on 5 June 1941, several thousand 
people were killed in a single instance in the city of Smederevo, 
on the outskirts of Belgrade, when 400,000 tons of ammuni-
tion stored in the city center by German occupation forces 
detonated.3 Additionally, during the war period (1939–1954), 
there were at least six other major events involving munitions 
being transported or stored that were not directly attributable 
to hostile action, which resulted in nearly 2,000 deaths of mili-
tary and civilian personnel.4
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QRF personnel conduct ordnance removal activities in February 2009 following a munitions depot explosion in  
Chelopechene, Bulgaria.
All photos courtesy of QRF.
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Between 1995 and May 2010, nearly 218 incidents in-
volving ammunition depots occurred, resulting in at least 
4,700 fatalities and 5,700 injuries.4,5 These instances can 
have the same detrimental effects on populations, infra-
structure and development as landmines and explosive 
remnants of war.4,5,6 Arguably the largest one of these catas-
trophes took place in Lagos, Nigeria, on 27 January 2002. 
An explosion at the Ikeja ammunition depot in the center 
of Lagos resulted in more than 1,100 civilian and military 
deaths with an additional 5,000 injured. The accident also 
displaced 20,000 people and destroyed much of the north-
ern part of the city.4,5 A fire near the depot reportedly ini-
tiated the explosion; however, other reports attribute the 
accident’s cause to the aged and deteriorated condition of 
the stored ordnance.4,5
According to the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the 
U.S. has provided assistance in promoting the safe dispos-
al of surplus weapons and aging munitions since 2001.4,5,6 
Recognizing the need to respond immediately to emer-
gency situations involving conventional weapons de-
struction (CWD), the Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. DOS Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs (PM/WRA) awarded DynCorp International (DI) 
a five-year contract in September 2008 to cover recruit-
ment, equipment, training and deployment costs of a quick 
reaction force (QRF) with worldwide availability.
DI provided the necessary support infrastructure, as well 
as a team of highly qualified and certified weapons remov-
al and abatement technical specialists, in order to swiftly de-
stroy conventional weapons caches and remove potentially 
deadly explosive munitions. From September 2008 through 
September 2013, QRF responded to 25 urgent situations in-
volving CWD, including three post-accident clearance oper-
ations in ammunition storage areas in Bulgaria, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Tanzania.
Bulgaria, January 2009
On 3 July 2008, a series of 11 unexplained explosions at 
the Chelopechene ammunition depot near Sofia, Bulgaria, 
rocked Chelopechene and the surrounding area. The ex-
plosions forced the evacuation of 1,700 of the 2,500 resi-
dents that lived in the town, and the airport was temporarily 
closed.7 Most of the approximately 1,600–2,500 tons of obso-
lete munitions and 15–20 tons of explosives stored at the de-
pot were damaged, constituting a danger.7,8 At the request of 
the Bulgarian government, a two-person QRF team was sent 
to Sofia on 22 November 2008 to assess the Chelopechene 
facility. Following discussions with Bulgarian officials, an 
The aftermath of a 2012 ammunition depot explosion in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo.
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additional 12 personnel were dispatched 
to conduct surface clearance operations 
only to eliminate the immediate haz-
ard to the civilian population. On 29 
March 2009, QRF concluded all site op-
erations and demobilized after clearing 
62,022 sq km (38,539 sq mi), recovering 
110,416 pieces of ordnance and dispos-
ing of 1,079 munitions items.9 The total 
deployment time was 96 days.
Tanzania, February 2011
On 16 February 2011, several ex-
plosions destroyed 23 munitions stor-
age structures at the Gongola Mboto 
army depot in the Ilala district, a few 
kilometers from the international air-
port in Dar es Salam, Tanzania. The 
detonations killed at least 20 people, 
wounded more than 100 and displaced 
thousands of nearby residents.10 After 
receiving a request from Dar es Salam, 
PM/WRA directed the deployment 
of a six-person QRF team to assist the 
Tanzanians in conducting CWD opera-
tions at the Gongola Mboto army depot. 
During the course of the 150-day oper-
ation, the QRF team destroyed 13,843 
items of hazardous ordnance, collected 
349.4 tons of scrap, and identified and 
consolidated more than 14,000 pieces 
of ordnance for future disposal by the 
Tanzanian army.
Republic of the Congo, March 2012
On 4 March 2012, a suspected fire 
initiated at least five separate explosions 
at the Regiment Blinde munitions de-
pot in the Mpila neighborhood in the 
center of Brazzaville, the Republic of 
the Congo’s capital. The explosion scat-
tered thousands of munitions and oth-
er weapons stockpiles across an area of 
4 to 6 sq km (1.5 to 2.3 sq mi). The blast 
left 20,000 people homeless, and an esti-
mated 220 people were killed and 2,300 
injured.11,12 The area where the detona-
tion hit hardest also contained two of 
the most populous districts in the city: 
Ouenzé and Talangai.12 Upon receiving a 
request from the Republic of the Congo’s 
government, PM/WRA directed the de-
ployment of a six-person QRF team on 
7 March 2012 to conduct an assessment 
of the explosive hazards in the area, 
make recommendations for the clean-
up, and provide assistance for unexplod-
ed ordnance clearance. Each QRF team 
member supervised a five-man crew in 
picking up and moving items that were 
deemed safe to move, and initiated pro-
tective works and disposal of items that 
could not be moved. During its 55-day 
deployment, the QRF team worked in 
close coordination and cooperation with 
U.N. personnel, as well as several non-
governmental organizations.
Lessons Learned
Of the CWD responses mentioned 
previously, lessons learned include  
•	 Large stores of ammunit ion 
should be located away from pop-
ulation centers.
•	 Fire and ammunition do not mix. 
Human negligence caused many 
of the fires involving ammunition, 
but a large number also involved 
the spontaneous combustion of 
unstable artillery propellant.
•	 Ammunition does not age well. A 
significant percentage of accidents 
over the years involved old and 
deteriorated ordnance.
•	 There should be minimal move-
ment of old or deteriorated am-
munition.
•	 Disassembly of stockpiled ammu-
nition should only be undertaken 
by highly qualified technical per-
sonnel.
•	 Deteriorating ammunition should 
be stored separately from service-
able munitions.
•	 Recycling of old ammunition to 
recover precious metals should 
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only be done following a thor-
ough risk assessment.
•	 Artillery propellant or projectile 
fuzes should not be underesti-
mated, as they commonly cause 
serious ammunition accidents.
•	 White phosphorous munitions 
should be stored separately from 
high explosive ordnance.
These lessons can help prevent am-
munition depot explosions and the sub-
sequent loss of lives, injuries and 
property. Preventing ammunition acci-
dents saves lives and is far less expensive 
than cleaning up the aftermath. 
All views and opinions expressed in 
this article are the author’s and do not 
necessarily represent the U.S. Govern-
ment or any previous employer.
See endnotes page 50
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